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Abstract – The present article explores the origin and changes in partnership agreements established between agro-
industries and oil palm smallholders in Cameroon. The diﬀerent forms of partnership which have existed over the
years in the oil palm sector until now are assessed, notably the FONADER-sponsored smallholder scheme (1978 to
1991) and more recently the Afriland First Bank sponsored villagisation project of Socapalm Eseka (2007/2008 to
present). Special attention is given to the factors and conditions that have influenced the outcomes of these partnerships,
specifically the failure of the FONADER-sponsored smallholder scheme. The authors conclude that with the current
absence of steady support from the government to oil palm smallholders, especially after the implementation of the
structural adjustment plans, private partnership schemes between agro-industries and oil palm smallholders could be
highly profitable for both stakeholders. Such partnerships can foster social cohesion and limit further encroachment
of agro-industries into the primary forest, provided such partnership agreements are carefully planned and adequately
implemented.
Keywords: FONADER / Afriland First Bank / partnership / smallholders / agro-industry / oil palm
Résumé – Histoire du partenariat entre les agro-industries et les petits exploitants de palmiers à huile au
Cameroun. Cet article étudie l’origine et l’évolution des accords de partenariat établis entre les agro-industries et les
petits exploitants de palmiers à huile au Cameroun. Les diﬀérentes formes de partenariat qui ont existé dans le secteur
de l’huile de palme au fil des ans jusqu’à présent sont évalués, notamment le projet FONADER qui a parrainé les petits
exploitants (1978 à 1991) et, plus récemment, Afriland First Bank qui a parrainé le projet villagisation de Socapalm
Eseka (2007–2008 jusqu’à présent). Une attention particulière est accordée aux facteurs et conditions qui ont influencé
les résultats de ces partenariats, en particulier à l’échec du parrainage des petits exploitants par le FONADER. En
l’absence actuelle de tout soutien significatif de la part du gouvernement aux petits exploitants de palmiers à huile,
en particulier après la mise en oeuvre des plans d’ajustement structurel, les programmes de partenariat privé entre les
agro-industries et les petits exploitants de palmiers à huile pourraient être très bénéfiques aux deux parties prenantes.
Ces partenariats peuvent favoriser la cohésion sociale et limiter l’empiétement des agro-industries sur la forêt primaire,
à condition que ces accords de partenariat soient soigneusement planifiés et bien mis en oeuvre.
Mots clés : FONADER / Afriland First Bank / partenariat / petits exploitants / agro-industrie / palmier à huile
1 Introduction
The oil palm (Elæis guineensis) is a perennial plant native
to the humid tropics of West and Central Africa which grows
between 10 degrees North and 10 degrees South latitude. In
these regions it is very common to find oil palm growing spon-
taneously in the wild, in isolated stands or as natural oil palm
groves.
The human populations living in the forest zone of
Cameroon have always been using oil palm products: the crude
red oil extracted from the mesocarp of the fruit, the oil con-
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tained in the kernel (sometimes called white oil) and the sap
which ferments spontaneously to generate palm wine. How-
ever, palm oil (its main product) led to its worldwide success
as far back as the first half of the 19th century. This was the
result of an increased demand generated by the industrial revo-
lution in Europe (notably to lubricate railway truck axles) and,
to a lesser degree, for palm kernel oil as the margarine indus-
try developed in Germany and the Netherlands (Jannot et al.,
2003).
The development of the oil palm sector in Cameroon be-
gan with the harvesting of spontaneous oil palm groves and
the incorporation of sprouted seedlings into farmlands inside
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agroforestry systems. The annexation of Cameroon by the
Germans induced the development of large scale plantations
by private German firms before WWI. After the defeat of
the Germans by the British and the French in 1916, the in-
dustrialization of these plantations began with the creation of
Pamol plantations in 1928 then the Cameroon Development
Corporation (CDC) in 1947/48, before Independence and re-
unification, respectively in 1960 and 1961. During this period,
very little was done to develop the smallholders’ oil palm sec-
tor. Although Pamol began with the development of village
plantations for the local population in the 1960s and 1970s,
CDC on its part did very little to develop oil palm planta-
tions for the local population. After the creation of “la Société
camerounaise de palmeraies” (SOCAPALM) in 1968 under a
Nucleus Estate Smallholder (NES) model, it is only in the late
1970s that the government of Cameroon – as part of its poverty
reduction strategy – decided to develop oil palm smallholdings
for the locals. A partnership between major agro-industries
and oil palm smallholders was created with funding assistance
from the World Bank and it was placed under the supervision
of the “fonds national du développement rural” (FONADER)
(Ndjogui et al., 2014, Nkongho et al., 2014). According to Car-
rère (2010), about 35 000 ha of smallholdings were developed
within 12 years during the FONADER-sponsored scheme.
Our research followed three main objectives: (i) to trace
changes in the oil palm industry in the country; (ii) to describe
its various stakeholders and (iii) to analyze the diﬀerent part-
nership schemes that were put in place by institutions over time
in order to develop the oil palm sector in Cameroon and some
of the challenges they faced.
2 Methodology
The present research work relies on multiple sources of
information. A thorough literature review has been conducted
through data mining from scientific publications, students’ the-
sis and reports from various public services, NGOs and inter-
national institutions. Media reports were also analyzed on the
internet. Oil palm companies also contributed to our sources
by the kind opening of their archives and statistical informa-
tion even if very little historical data was available from the
archives of the companies.
Our literature review was complemented by three field sur-
veys conducted in 2011, 2012 and 2013 in the Centre, Littoral
and Southwest regions in which major oil palm development
took place over the years. These regions harbor five agro-
industrial oil palm companies (Socapalm, Pamol, Cameroon
Development Corporation (CDC), Société des Palmeraies de
la Ferme Suisse (SPFS), and Safacam) and more than three
quarters of all oil palm smallholders/holdings are located in
these regions. Figure 1 shows the location of large oil palm
companies in the Cameroon oil palm belt.
Our research focused on the various ways oil palm was
cultivated locally before the development of monocultural oil
palm plantations by agro-industries. It was aimed at analyz-
ing the various partnership models which existed or are still
existing between plantation companies and smallholders, the
reasons for the collapse of these partnerships when it oc-
curred and the emergence of the second generation of oil palm
“smallholders”.
Lastly our survey intended to understand the current mea-
sures put in place by agroindustries to strengthen their bonds
with oil palm smallholders and to study innovative strategies
from the government of Camerooon for the development of
the oil palm sector. A total of 155 respondents were inter-
viewed through a purposive sampling method in the course
of a survey which consisted in 3 field trips of about 3 weeks
each. The distribution of the sample was as follows: 35 retired
company oﬃcials (senior supervisors and managers), 35 com-
pany oﬃcials in active service (senior supervisors and man-
agers) and 80 key palm oil producers (50 from the FONADER
scheme and 30 from the so called “Projet Villagisation”) in-
cluding 5 oﬃcials from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development. In case of doubt, the same questions were cross-
checked with other resource persons in order to ensure their
validity.
3 Results
This section is divided into the following sub-headings;
a historical overview of the oil palm sector in Cameroon,
Pamol Plantations and the development of oil palm smallhold-
ers, Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) and relations
with oil palm smallholders, the nucleus estate and smallholder
(NES) partnership (FONADER sponsored scheme), the col-
lapse of FONADER and the emergence of independent palm
oil producers, Projet Villagisation in Socapalm Eseka, as well
as current measures adopted by agro-industries to strengthen
links with smallholders.
3.1 A historical overview of the oil palm sector
in Cameroon
Before the arrival of the European colonizers, the local
population inhabiting the forest zone of Cameroon harvested
the native variety of oil palm (dura) from spontaneous groves
for subsistence and trade. Oil palms were harvested in the wild
and introduced on farmland through the collection of sprouted
seedlings from oil palm groves and they were grown in as-
sociation with other food and cash crops. It is only with the
arrival of the German colonizers by the end of the 19th cen-
tury that large scale cultivation of oil palm started. As far back
as 1877, Douala Chiefs requested Britain to establish a protec-
torate. The British procrastinated for seven years and by the
time they finally made their move, it was too late. The na-
tive chiefs, tired of waiting for the British to make up their
mind, contracted a treaty with Gustav Nachtigal, representing
Germany, on July 14, 1884 (Bederman, 1968). Almost a year
later, in 1885, the British recognized all German claims, ex-
cept those involving Victoria. After negotiation for compensa-
tion for the Baptist Missions, the British abandoned all claims
to Kamerun in 1886, and shortly thereafter, the Basel Mis-
sion took over the work of the Baptist. France recognized the
German Protectorate in a treaty signed on December 1885.
The Germans were faced with two major problems in
the course of their trade with the indigenous population of
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Fig. 1. Map of agro-industrial oil palm companies in Cameroon.
Kamerun. First, the coastal chiefs in Douala refused to al-
low the Germans to trade directly with the populations in the
hinterland since they were making a lot of profit from their
position as middlemen between the indigenous traders and
the Germans. Second, the major waterways on either side of
the territory were controlled by the British and the French. The
Germans then sent explorers around Mount Kamerun to nego-
tiate with local chiefs in order to improve trade. It quickly be-
came apparent to the Germans that the lower slopes were quite
suitable for commercial exploitation. In the Mount Kamerun
area alone, the Germans alienated 400 square miles of the
most fertile land (83 000 hectares belonging to the indigenous
Bakweri). In fact, they seized the land without financial com-
pensation to any of the rightful owners. According to Courade
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(1984) the Bakweri were forced either to move into prescribed
restricted native reserves or outside the alienated lands.
Even if much land was alienated from the Bakweri it
was not totally exploited by the private German plantations.
Throughout the German colonial period the most important
plantation crops were cocoa, rubber and oil palm. Minor crops
were kola, tobacco and coﬀee and almost all were exported to
Germany. In 1892 the Germans established a botanical garden
in Victoria (presently called Limbe). The purpose of this gar-
den was to undertake experiments on diﬀerent types of soils
at diﬀerent elevations and under variable moisture conditions.
The botanical garden distributed free seeds and cuttings to
the local population and at the same time it provided valu-
able information about the proper exploitation of the colony’s
resources.
Before the interwar period (1916 to 1939), the first indus-
trial plantation in Kamerun was initiated in 1907 under the
German colonial rule, leading to the creation of the Edea oil
palm estate in 1909, which was later renamed “Société des
palmeraies de la ferme suisse (SPFS)”. The Germans con-
tinued the development of industrial plantations on the fertile
slopes and plains of Mount Fako until the beginning of World
War I. Shortly after WWI began, the British and French forces
invaded the German colony. By December 1914, the British
were controlling the Victoria division. By February 1916, the
whole Kamerun territory was in the hands of the British and
French. One month later an agreement dividing Kamerun be-
tween the two countries was signed in London. In July 1922,
the smaller British portion became a mandate of the League
of Nations and was assigned to the United Kingdom to be ad-
ministered along with Nigeria. The properties of the German
citizens were confiscated and turned over to the “Custodian
of Enemy Property” to be administered for the duration of
the war. In 1924, properties in both the French and British
sectors were put up for sale. In French Cameroon, the for-
mer German plantations were purchased by French, British
and Cameroonian businessmen. This was the direct opposite
of what happened in the British Cameroon as almost all the
plantations were purchased by their former German owners.
In addition to land, the sales included the railway system,
rolling stock, bridges, wharves and all dwellings and factories.
Between 1925 and 1939, most of the trade between British
Cameroon and Europe occurred through Germany. At the out-
break of World War II in 1939, the German properties were
expropriated again by the ‘Custodian of Enemy Property’ and
with this act, the German activity in Cameroon came to an end.
By 1919, in the western part of the country occupied by the
British, four of these plantations were bought by the Unilever
group (they include Bwinga, Bai, Lobe and Ndian) which in
addition obtained a concession area of 10,000 ha for the cre-
ation of “Pamol Plantations” (Barbier et al., 1980). In 1947,
the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) was cre-
ated from the merging of former German plantations around
Mount Fako. Meanwhile another former German plantation
“La Plantation de Dizangué” was bought in 1959 by the
Rivaud group. This plantation is known today as the “Société
africaine forestière et agricole du Cameroun (SAFACAM)”.
The last agro-industry to be developed “la Société camer-
ounaise de palmeraies (SOCAPALM)” was created in 1968
by the Government of Cameroon, then privatized in 2000. SO-
CAPALM, SAFACAM and SPFS are now controlled by the
French group Bolloré, while CDC and Pamol are the only re-
maining public companies (Carrère, 2010; Oben and Fanso,
2012; Ndjogui et al., 2014).
3.2 Pamol plantations and the development of oil palm
smallholdings
Pamol plantations actually began with the development of
smallholder plantations in the 1960s/70s. Six villages with cus-
tomary rights to the land leased to Pamol Plantation in Lobe
actually benefitted from the creation of 10 hectares of demon-
stration farms in each of these villages. These were namely:
Ngolo-Metoko, Bogongo 1, Lipenja, Kumbe Balondo, Lobe
town and Ekondo-Titi. The farms were entrusted to the vil-
lagers through the village council that was headed by a chief.
While the villagers were in charge of inter-row slashing the
company undertook the harvesting and pruning of the palms.
Four reasons prompted Pamol Plantations to open oil palm
plantations for the benefit of these villages: (i) corporate so-
cial responsibility; (ii) the need for an extra supply of fresh
fruit bunches; (iii) to divert the villagers from stealing fruits
from the company’s plantations and last but not least, (iv) the
company realized that it was cost-eﬀective to open smallholder
plantations instead of embarking on new development of its
own plantations due to huge costs. This was verified when
the company wanted to carry out an extension of the Ngolo-
Metoko division (Nkwain, Field Assistant Pamol, pers. com.).
Pamol encouraged smallholders to open plantations on
their own with the hope that they would supply their palm
fruits to the company. Incentives included the supply of se-
lected planting material either at subsidized rates or free of
charge. The company went further in the 1980s and early
1990s and it recommended to the farmers to group into cooper-
atives in order to facilitate the running of its Smallholders De-
partment. As a result a number of cooperatives sprouted which
included: Campers, Mushcoops, Secoops, Ekoscoop, Manja
Youths CIG, Mebeek CIG, Providence CIG, Catholic Mission
Ikassa and others. The advantages of membership included the
possibility of buying seeds at discount rates from the company
at 100 FCFA (0.15 e) instead of 200 FCFA (0.3 e), an access
to credit from the bank and a better position for negotiation
with Pamol management on issues of common interest for the
farmers. But these cooperatives did not last for long due to
corruption practices, power tussle amongst its members and
embezzlement of funds (Metuge, retired Divisional Manager
Pamol, pers.com.).
3.3 The Cameroon development corporation (CDC)
and its relationship with smallholders
After independence and re-unification of Cameroon, the
CDC invited experts from the Commonwealth Development
Corporation headed by Swynnerton in 1964 to draft a long
term development plan for the company. In its report, the
mission advised the company to set up various smallholder
schemes for rubber, oil palm and tea and to extend its role
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in smallholder development from trade to production. Such a
role included the continuous supply of inputs, credit and tech-
nical advice as well as a strict supervision process. It was also
recommended to install a Smallholder Development Authority
by the Federal State of West Cameroon, which would be re-
sponsible for the planning and implementation of smallholder
schemes in the territory. This recommendation unfortunately
never came into fruition.
Though the Swynnerton proposal was not implemented
neither by CDC nor by the federal government, CDC became
involved in smallholder development (Konings, 1993). After
independence and re-unification (which was concomitant with
a sharp decrease in banana production at CDC, due to a fall in
price at the world market) most banana farmers were grouped
into cooperatives, notably the Bakweri Cooperative Union of
Farmers (BCUF).
These farmers decided to use their saved capital to diver-
sify into oil palm and rubber production. Farmers then resorted
to CDC to support the purchase, transportation and marketing
of their palm fruits. The West Cameroon Department of Agri-
culture and Cooperative was very instrumental in the negoti-
ating process between farmers and CDC. This farmer’s group
was made of various peasant and middle-class farmers with
discrepancies in terms of plantation area. Their major problem
after reaching a consensus with CDC was that most of their
plantations were scattered all over the Southwest Region thus
making the management by CDC very diﬃcult. More, they
had to struggle with low purchasing prices for their palm fruits
from CDC (Konings, 1993).
3.4 The nucleus estate and smallholder (NES)
partnership (FONADER sponsored scheme)
The 1960s were the time of decolonization in Africa. Most
African countries then opted for the diversification of their
agricultural income and for the local processing of agricul-
tural products. Countries from the “oil palm belt” promoted the
development of oil palm amongst other crops such as cocoa,
coﬀee or rubber (Bakoumé, 2006; Jannot, 2010). The Gov-
ernment of Cameroon was not an exception and followed this
trend after the Independence of French Cameroon in 1960 and
further unification with British Cameroon in 1961. The new
independent government decided to adopt the “Nucleus Estate
and Smallholders” (NES) model for its national oil palm devel-
opment plan. This involved a palm oil mill surrounded by an
estate, surrounded itself by plantations owned by smallholders.
In 1963, the Government decided to develop the cultivation of
oil palm and it created the Socapalm plantation by Presidential
decree No. 68/DF/45 on 23 November 1968 (Andela, 2006).
The first oil palm development plan was initiated by
the Government of Cameroon with financial support from
the World Bank in 1977 and 1978. Under this scheme the
first generation of oil palm smallholders came into existence
(1977/1978–1990/1991). The plan was developed under the
authority of the FONADER. Three agro-industrial oil palm
companies benefited from this scheme, namely: CDC, Soca-
palm and Pamol which were selected for their technical exper-
tise (Courade, 1984; Lebailly and Tentchou, 2009; Raﬄegeau
et al., 2010; Feintrenie and Raﬄegeau, 2012; Feintrenie, 2013;
Table 1. Yearly installment of credit plus interest.
Installment
Year of credit plus
interest (in %)
6 5.5%
7 10.0%
8 14.0 %
9 16.0%
10 17.0%
11 18.0%
12 19.5%
Source: FONADER contracts.
Ndjogui et al., 2014). Smallholders who wanted to join the
scheme were requested to sign a contract with one of the afore-
mentioned companies. Such contracts stipulated the conditions
for participation and the mutual obligations of the contracting
parties. The most important conditions for participation were
the following:
• candidates had to be of Cameroonian nationality and to
generate at least 75% of their income from farming;
• they had to be between 25 and 40 years of age and physi-
cally fit to run a farm.
However, older persons who could rely on the labour force
from younger relatives could also qualify. Any candidate had
to own his proper piece of land which had to comply with the
conditions of the contract. Indeed, it had to be: (i) within a
radius of 30 km from the company’s mill; (ii) located at less
than 500 m from a road or a track usable by the company’s ve-
hicles and (iii) suitable for oil palm cultivation and covered by
a land use permit for at least twenty-four years. Finally, candi-
dates had to obtain the company’s approval for participating in
the scheme (Konings, 1993).
The obligations of the two contracting parties were as fol-
lows: farmers had to scrupulously follow all instructions given
by the company regarding labour, to attend all meetings con-
vened by the company for training and farm management prac-
tice, to sell all their fruit harvest to the company and to settle
all their debts with the company. The company had to pro-
vide the participating farmers with the necessary inputs, tech-
nical advice and supervision. These services were to be ren-
dered on credit and had to be repaid in increasing installments
after palms had begun bearing fruits with an annual interest
rate of 9%, plus a 2% deduction from the amounts of these
purchases for management fees. The credit to be paid by the
farmers included the cost of oil palm development and main-
tenance for 5 years. The repayment of the credit plus interest
was supposed to begin from the 6th to the 12th year, giving
a period of 7 years in increasing installment as shown on Ta-
ble 1. Deduction of credit was based on the age of palms, since
FFB production increases with age for about 15 years or more
(FONADER contract, unpublished).
Repayment was to be deducted from the sales to the com-
pany. In addition, the company’s management had to transport
the harvested fruits to the mill for a fixed price. Lastly, the
company had to pay for the producer’s harvest on a monthly
basis. Participants were expected to run between 2 and 5 ha
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of plantations with improved planting material. The conse-
quence of any failure to comply with the terms of contract
was the immediate seizure of the land by the company. The
contract covered a period of 27 years from the year of first
land clearing, and following the repayment of all debts, the
participants were to receive a land certificate registered in the
survey department. During the early period of immature plan-
tation, the farmers were granted a non-refundable cash grant
of 56 900 FCFA (86.74 e) lumpsum as a remuneration for
their labour input. The project went further to foster rural de-
velopment through continuous roads and infrastructures main-
tenance in areas where these smallholders oil palm plantations
were located and this was part of the companies’ obligations
to the Government (Konings, 1986; Bakoumé et al., 2002;
Raﬄegeau, 2008).
Before the collapse of FONADER in 1990 a Smallholders
Department was operating as a separate entity in each of the
agro-industrial companies, under a separate management from
the nucleus estate. Each Smallholders Department was in con-
trol of its own personnel, material and transport facilities. This
greatly facilitated relationship with farmers as the transporta-
tion of fresh fruit bunches from the farms to the nucleus mill
was done on time. Coupled with material and technical support
given to the farmers, this greatly kept the relationship between
the two parties alive.
3.4.1 The collapse of FONADER and the emergence
of independent palm oil producers
Both internal and external factors have caused the col-
lapse of FONADER. Internally the FONADER management
was over-centralized with the absence of acting representa-
tives at the regional and divisional levels around the country.
This was a major cause of delay in disbursing funds earmarked
for on-going projects. Other studies suggested that the gov-
ernment might have diverted funds from FONADER to other
non-productive sectors. In the oil palm sector, it was found that
some companies paid more attention to their own plantations
than to smallholders’ ones. Foko (1994) reports that a huge
amount of paperwork was necessary before benefiting from
FONADER funds and this was probably another limitation
for the rural population which was still partly illiterate. Elong
(2003) stresses that about 70% of the total smallholder plan-
tations developed in lower Mungo by 1989 fell in the hands
of urban elites. The external causes which led to the collapse
of FONADER include: (i) the withdrawal of the World Bank
which was considered as a major source of funding for FON-
ADER; (ii) the decline in global export prices of several agri-
cultural commodities such as coﬀee, cocoa, cotton or banana;
and (iii) the withdrawal of the Government from the productive
and most especially the rural sector due the economic crisis of
the late 1980s.
After the bankruptcy of FONADER in 1990, a new gener-
ation of oil palm smallholders came into the game. This was
due to a series of concomitant factors which included: the re-
duction of a large number of civil servants in the Cameroon
public service due to the structural adjustment program, the
economic crisis, the devaluation of the CFA Franc, a fall in
the international market for cocoa and coﬀee (two important
cash crops on which most farmers relied for their income) and
an increase in the domestic price for palm oil (Ndigui et al.,
2006; Nkongho et al., 2014). The structural adjustment pro-
gram imposed by the International Monetary Fund on the gov-
ernment of Cameroon in the late 1980s accelerated the pri-
vatization of 15 public enterprises in the transportation and
agro-industrial sector in July 1994 (Hirsch, 1995; Konings,
1996, 1997; Cheyns and Raﬄegeau, 2005). This led to the lib-
eralization of the palm oil sector. As a consequence, the num-
ber of artisanal palm oil mills scattered all over the oil palm
production basins of Cameroon increased sharply (Hirsch,
2000; Nkongho et al., 2014). This second generation of oil
palm smallholders was not only made of peasant farmers but
also of internal or external elites. Internal elites include for-
mer workers with the public and private sectors on retirement
and who wanted to live as pensioners in their village of ori-
gin together with village leaders. External elites include the
same category of people, but who do not reside in the village.
Some of these elites hold top positions in the public and pri-
vate sectors. Most of them single-handedly sponsored their oil
palm plantations, with very little or no support from the gov-
ernment and some of them opened large estates of 50 ha and
above as shown in Figure 2. This figure describes the areas of
oil palm plantations owned by elite palm oil producers in four
production basins in the forest zone of Cameroon when in-
vestigated in 2011. When compared to their first generation
counterpart under the FONADER scheme, second generation
oil palm planters owned larger land areas.
After the collapse of FONADER the companies had to
merge the management of the Smallholder Department with
that of the Nucleus Estate in order to reduce running costs.
Some of the top executives saw this merging as a unique op-
portunity to divert resources that were previously dedicated to
smallholders for their personal use. Such dishonest behaviours
were made possible by very poor tracking records in the com-
panies. Priority was also given to the milling of fruits from the
Estate and to the payment of salaries of the company’s work-
ers. Smallholders also complained about the purchase price for
fresh fruit bunches which – at 25 to 40 FCFA (0.04 to 0.06 e)
per kg – was not covering their production costs. The clo-
sure of Smallholder Departments as independent entities made
most smallholders reluctant to supply their fruits to the com-
pany mill in order to pay back their loans. There were recurrent
conflicts and intimidations between company oﬃcials and oil
palm smallholders who did not comply with the payment of
their loans (Njanjo, retired Senior Smallholder Overseer CDC,
pers. com.). According to Foko (1994), local populations con-
sidered credit support through government banks like FON-
ADER as a gift, and this made them very reluctant to reim-
burse their loans.
Facing such challenges, most of the new generation of oil
palm smallholders started searching for independent ways of
processing their fresh fruit bunches and this led to an upsurge
in the number of artisanal mills both within the periphery of
the agro-industries and in far-oﬀ areas (Raﬄegeau et al., 2010;
Nkongho et al., 2014).
During the same period the occurrence of fruit theft in-
creased in the major oil palm agroindustries, a situation that
is still rampant today (PACA, 2009; Nkongho et al., 2014).
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Fig. 2. Distribution of surface areas for elite planters.
Table 2. Cultivated areas and productivity in agro-industries and smallholders in Cameroon.
Surface Mature Immature Production Yield
Year 2012 area area area tons tons
(ha) (ha) (ha) CPO CPO/ha
CDC 14 352 10 250 4102 18 309 1.79
Pamol 9526 9133 393 12 878 1.41
Safacam 4792 3936 856 11 742 2.5
Ferme Suisse (SPFS) 3683 – – 11 000 2.99
Socapalm 32 000 – – 86 000 2.69
Smallholder plantations 40 000–100 000 – – 90 000 2.25–0.9
Total 100 670–160 670 229 929
Source: Field survey, data from agro-industries, 2013.
It is important to note that the present relationship between
oil palm smallholders of both generations and major agro-
industrial companies is a matter of convenience. This implies
that most smallholders can only supply their fresh bunches to
the nucleus mill either during peak production period when
they are aware that the capacity of their artisanal mills or
commercial artisanal mills cannot accommodate the supply of
fresh bunches from their plantations or when their artisanal
mills gets out of order. It is rare to find any smallholder to-
day who delivers 100% of his fresh bunches to any of these
companies.
At present, oil palm growers are faced with four major
problems which include: very little access to credit, availability
of certified selected seeds, inputs, and technical capacity build-
ing (Ndoum, 2009; Ngom, 2011; Feintrenie, 2012; Nkongho
et al., 2014). This situation has serious eﬀects on the produc-
tion capacity of smallholders, as shown on Table 2. Moreover,
public companies like Pamol and CDC also struggle with very
low yields when compared to private companies. A company
like Pamol has not ammended its plantations with fertilizers
for the past 28 years.
3.5 Projet villagisation in Socapalm Eseka
Socapalm was developed in 1968 as a way of stepping up
the production of palm oil and to generate income and employ-
ment opportunities for the local population. By 1978, the gov-
ernment also initiated a smallholders scheme and Socapalm
was selected for the development of village plantations. The
project was well accepted in the surrounding villages. With
the collapsing of the scheme in the early nineties due to the
FONADER bankruptcy, the smallholders were left alone. So-
capalm was a publicly owned company from its creation un-
til 2000 when the Government decided to privatize the com-
pany. Immediately after Socapalm was privatized, it faced stiﬀ
resistance from the local population who either wanted their
land back or asked for massive compensations from the com-
pany’s owners. Local populations found that when their land
was seized by the Government in the late 1960s for the devel-
opment of Socapalm, no reasonable compensation was given
to the villages who had customary rights to the land. The case
of Socapalm Eseka was not an exception and this prompted the
company to start looking for ways of working together with
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the local population. As a result, the Villagisation Project was
designed to begin at Eseka at first and then to spread to the
other Socapalm estates in Dibombari, Mbongo, Mbambou and
Kienke.
The Villagisation Project at Socapalm Eseka started in
2007. Upon the privatization of Socapalm, 6485 ha was the
total concession area of Socapalm Eseka. Within this area,
2601 ha were made up of very old palms planted between 1970
and 1973. Such palms should have been replanted because they
were already older than their normal economic life span and
the remaining area of the concession was supposed to undergo
extension.
Socapalm faced stiﬀ resistance from the local population
of Eseka to carry out the replanting of the 2601 ha piece of
land made up of old palms. According to the local population,
it is the palms that were privatized by the Government to the
company but not the land. Thus they did not see any reason
why the company had to embark on a replanting scheme. In
short, the native people never liked the idea of privatization
and considered that the government should have given the land
back to them.
There was also a high level of theft by the local population
who frequently encroached into the plantation to steal fresh
fruit bunches. This situation – coupled with the old age of
palms – made the cost of production very high for the com-
pany thus it was diﬃcult for Socapalm to break even. This led
to a series of layoﬀs of some company workers at Socapalm
Eseka and management at the general directorate thought it
was time to come into a consensus with the local population
by starting the Villagisation Project.
3.5.1 Stakeholders of the project
The project is 95% funded by Afriland First Bank for
a 1 423 000 000 FCFA (2 169 353 e) total budget. Each in-
dividual who was eligible to benefit from a plot was sup-
posed to pay 5% of the requested amount depending on the
plot area and this amount was paid directly in the account
of Socapalm. Socapalm and the German Development Bank
respectively paid a 20% and 80% deposit on a separate ac-
count dedicated to Afriland First Bank in case the planters
were unable to complete the re-imbursement of their credit
within 8 years. The planters were requested to pay back their
credit through the supply to Socapalm of fresh fruit bunches
harvested from their plots. As a result, a diﬀerent agreement
was signed between three diﬀerent consortia, namely (Afri-
land First Bank, Mitfund, Grower) then (Socapalm, Mitfund,
Grower) then (Socapalm, Grower). The contract signed by
each of the diﬀerent stakeholders consortium clearly described
the responsibilities of each institution involved in the scheme.
Indeed, Afriland First Bank was responsible for the financing
of 95% of the cost of the plots leased by Socapalm to the local
population for a period of 25 years.
Socapalm was requested to provide technical expertise to
selected growers and in return to buy all the fresh fruit bunches
harvested from their plots. Socapalm was also asked to bear the
cost of maintaining the roads of the plantation and the cost of
transportation of FFB from the farm to their mill. The growers
on their part had to bear 5% of the cost of land and to pay
back the entirety of their loan with an 8% interest for a period
of 8 years. Mitfund is the institution created by Afriland First
Bank to ensure that farmers eﬀectively paid their loan. Mitfund
is in charge of the monitoring and assessment on the progress
of reimbursement of the loan by the growers; MC2 is a micro
finance institution whose main responsibility was to pay the
net income of the growers after all the deductions had been
done.
To become a contractor, the following documents were re-
quired: registre de commerce (oﬃcial registration), carte de
contribuable (tax payer registration), patent rights and CNPS
(National Social Insurance Fund) contribution for workers.
Photocopies of these documents with an application form are
deposited at the company. Candidates also need to hire skilled
workers for field operations.
According to the agreement, the farmer was supposed to
undertake the day to day management of his plot and this could
be done through one of the following actors: the grower and his
family; the hiring of a temporary or permanent work force or
the cooperatives. In case of failure, Socapalm could step-in to
manage the plot for the grower. In usual cases, Socapalm was
there to provide the necessary technical expertise while in the
case of full overtaking, Socapalm will oversee all operations
on the plot, including the recruitment and payment of labour
and the work scheduling and execution.
No particular criteria were used to partition plots to those
who met all the requirements. As noted by most people, one of
the greatest hindrance which prevented people to buy plots was
the 5% down-payment needed. Under such a policy, people
who were not members of the villages with ancestral rights to
the concession area but were rich enough to pay for these 5%
were able to buy plots. Thus discrepancies in plot allocation
occurred in many ways. The plots were not equally distributed
as those who earned more were able to acquire more plots.
It was also possible for members whose villages did not fall
into the concession area to get plots. According to the Direc-
tor of Socapalm Eseka, when the project started, priority was
given to people from whom Socapalm was using their ancestral
land. Although when Socapalm managers realized that some of
these persons were not interested to join the project, they had
to accept people of the same ethnic group (Bassa) but without
any ancestral claims to the land.
3.5.2 Discrepancies in plots allocation
Several farmers claimed that the sensitization phase before
the start of the project was not properly implemented. They ar-
gued that information about the implementation of the scheme
was in the hands of a group of persons only, mostly the inter-
nal and external elites of the villages. More, information was
not well circulated through the organization of village meet-
ings gathering all stakeholders including Afriland First Bank,
Socapalm, divisional oﬃcers of the area, local chiefs, internal
and external elites and local populations of the villages who
had customary rights to the land used by Socapalm. Farmers
further stressed the fact that because of these failures there was
a lot of discrepancies in the attribution of plots to the local pop-
ulation. It was stipulated in the original agreement that 25% of
the plots had to go to the elites while 75% of the plots were
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Table 3. Yearly replanting program for the old palms.
Area already replanted Area expected to be replanted Total
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 (ha)
Areas (ha) 300 300 300 – 300 601 400 400 2601
Source: Field survey in SOCAPALM Eseka, 2013.
supposed to be the property of the local population (those who
strictly rely on agriculture for their subsistence). In reality the
exact contrary happened as internal and external elites grabbed
the majority of the plots. Some plots were even attributed to
persons whose villages did not have customary rights in the
concession area, however still of Bassa’a extraction, except
two non-natives from the Northwest region. Most of the elites
who owned plots in the scheme were “absentee landlords” who
can hardly locate their plots in the field.
Another group of people (locals/farmers) claimed that the
sensitization phase of the project was well carried out and that
detailed information on the implementation of the project was
circulated, but that some local people were reluctant to be part
of the project. Some of the reasons for such reluctance were:
• Villagers considered that they had customary rights to the
land and thus did not see why the company would want to
rent them a land that is actually their property.
• Others didn’t see any interest in acquiring old palm stands
which were no longer fully yielding. Indeed, most of
the palms were already above 34 years of age, thus far
above 25 years which is considered as the standard eco-
nomic life of a plantation.
• The 5% compulsory fee as the final criteria for eligibility to
own a plot was also a major obstacle, which helped elites
to grab more plots than poor farmers.
• It was even heard through the grapevine that after the pay-
ment of the 5% initial fee, the company might close down
its activities in Eseka.
3.5.3 Socapalm fully controls plot management
When the project started in 2007, Socapalm was in charge
by contract to provide technical assistance to the coopera-
tive managing the plots for the growers. The cooperative was
responsible to undertake the day-to-day management of the
plots. This could be done through the recruitment of labour
either through the use of temporary labour or the recruitment
of contractors or through individual contracts on specified pe-
riods or through the attribution of specific operations to con-
tractors who had the required skill and labour force. The coop-
erative was requested to have a management team headed by a
President, a Secretary, with field staﬀ to supervise contractors.
The cooperative was also established to raise money through
compulsory monthly payments from the planters. This sum
was 2052 FCFA (3.13 e) /ha and spontaneous contributions
from the planters depending on the need, the taking of credit
from Socapalm and MC2 to be paid with minimal interest. The
first cooperative to be part of the scheme was Socofepnyk, but
it did not last long as power tussle inside the cooperative led to
its splitting into two diﬀerent entities and another cooperative
named “Le Planteur” emerged. In June 2013, another cooper-
ative named “SCAB (Société coopérative Agri-Business)” was
created resulting from another split of “Le Planteur". When
the management of the plots was in the hands of these co-
operatives, the management staﬀ did very little to follow up
agricultural activities on the plots not to mention the embez-
zlement of funds originally dedicated to the plot management.
This poor situation led Socapalm to take full control of the
management of the plots as soon as the previous director of
the project was sacked for the misappropriation of funds des-
tined for the project in 2011. At present, Socapalm manages all
the farming operations. The company recruits temporary and
contracted workers and its staﬀ schedules and assesses all field
operations. All expenses incurred in the course of farm oper-
ations with exception of FFB transportation and road main-
tenance are billed to the planter who in turn is requested to
supply FFB to Socapalm for repayment. Socapalm began to
replace old palm stands in 2008 at farmers’ expense as shown
on Table 3.
Socapalm is paying back the loan contracted with Afriland
First Bank on a monthly basis on behalf of the planters whose
plots are unable to meet up with the credit re-imbursement. It
is thus expected that by 2015, the loan of Afriland First Bank
would have been fully paid.
That notwithstanding, the farmers will have to pay back
this money to Socapalm through the production and supply of
FFB from their plots. The size of a plot averages 8 to 10 ha
and the amount of money to pay for a given plot depends on
the distance to the mill and on the yield and height of the
palms. As such the cost per plot ranges from 262 000 FCFA/ha
to 1 006 000 FCFA/ha (399.42 to 1533.64 e/ha). Indeed, a
farmer who owns a 10 ha plot with a 1 006 000 FCFA/ha
rate is expected to pay: (1 006 000 FCFA × 10 ha) + 8/100 ×
(1 006 000 FCFA × 10 ha) = 10 806 480 FCFA (16 474.4 e)
including the payment of 8% interest.
It is from the main capital that Afriland First Bank had
to pay 95% to Socapalm on behalf of the planters, with
the planters themselves paying just 5%. This means that in
the present case, the farmer is supposed to reimburse the
sum of (95/100 × 10 006 000 + 8/100 × 10 006 000) FCFA
= 10 306 180 FCFA (15 711.69 e) and this credit is sup-
posed to be repaid after 8 years. So 10 306 180 FCFA/8 years
= 1 288 272.5 FCFA/year (1963.96 e/year) is the amount of
money the planter is supposed to reimburse per year.
In order to complete the reimbursement on a monthly ba-
sis, a schedule (Tab. 4) was designed which took into account
changes in FFB yields during the year. The January to June pe-
riod is the peak season, while the July–December one is con-
sidered as the low season for oil palm fruit production.
The order of monthly payments from the farmer is as
follows: (1) the debt to Afriland First Bank for that month,
(2) the cost of various farm operations for that month and
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Table 4. Monthly distribution in % of yearly sum for credit
reimbursement.
% of
Month monthly % cumulated
repayment
January 10.0% 10.0%
February 14.0% 24.0%
March 19.0% 43.0%
April 17.0% 60.0%
May 13.0% 73.0%
June 7.0% 80.0%
July 4.0% 84.0%
August 2.0% 86.0%
September 2.0% 88.0%
October 3.0% 91.0%
November 4.0% 95.0%
December 5.0% 100.0%
Source: SOCAPALM Eseka contract.
(3) payment of the cooperative management staﬀ. The rest
of income if any is kept in the farmer’s account at MC2,
the micro-finance institution acting for farmers. During inter-
views, farmers indicated that the cost of replanting that they
used to pay in 2009 at 359 238 FCFA/ha (547.66 e/ha) had
increased to between 500 000 FCFA and 550 000 FCFA/ha
(762.25 to 838.47 e/ha) in 2013. Table 5 shows the costs dis-
tribution for the replanting of one hectare of old palm grove
(November 2009). According to the Director of Socapalm
Eseka, the cost of various farm operations has increased be-
cause at first not all the operations were performed: for exam-
ple the old palms were not fertilized but today the replanted
ones receive fertilisers, which increases the costs.
Our survey shows that more men than women own plots
within the SOCAPALM Eseka scheme. Out of the 102 owners,
female owners are just about 15: they work in the public or
private sector, with an average age of 45 to 55 years.
When the project started, the maintenance of plots was
in the hands of the planters through their cooperative, with
some technical assistance from Socapalm. This situation did
not last long as some of the farm operations were signed on
paper but not executed in the field. The situation has then been
‘rescued’ by Socapalm which took over the full management
of the plot, but then farmers are complaining about increas-
ing costs. The result is that such plots are not yielding any
benefit to the grower at present and farmers are claiming that
they are presently working and losing money, since after all
monthly payments have been deducted, there is nothing left.
Another striking problem is labour, because most of the work-
force comes from the Northwestern and Northern regions of
Cameroon. The young natives from Eseka consider field work
as too strenuous and they do not accept waiting for payout un-
til the end of each month. Power struggle in cooperatives is
leading to recurrent splitting and subsequent generation of new
entities thus weakening the bargaining force with the com-
pany. Farmers also complain about the absence of a regula-
tory body in charge not only of establishing monthly prices for
FFB based on market trends for CPO but also of following up
the contract signed between farmers and Socapalm and ensur-
ing that their implementation is fairly balanced between both
parties.
3.5.4 A comparaison between FONADER and Afriland
First Bank sponsored schemes
– The FONADER sponsored scheme was established by the
Government of Cameroon with the aim of fighting poverty
with a focus on local populations living close to the agro-
industries. Among the criteria for eligibility the candidate
had to get 75% of income from farming activities; the
farmer was requested to own land accredited by the vil-
lage chief; he was to provide labour from his household
and he was requested to be at least 25 years of age.
– Candidates who were eligible to join the FONADER
scheme were not supposed to pay any entrance fee, con-
trary to the Afriland First Bank sponsored scheme, in
which eligible candidates were supposed to pay 5% of the
cost as an initial settlement. Also FONADER was using
public funds, while Afriland First Bank is a private bank.
– The mechanisms of the two schemes are not so diﬀerent.
Indeed the money for the development of plantations for
smallholders in the FONADER scheme was handed to the
company in cash and the company was requested to de-
velop the smallholder plot and provide the necessary in-
kind resources and technical services to the smallholder or
landowner. The company made profit from the supply of
Fresh Fruit Bunches from the smallholders’ farms and it
also determined the price of FFB. The farmers could repay
their loan through the supply of FFB to the company. The
slight diﬀerence in the two schemes is that in the case of
Afriland Firstbank, both Socapalm and the German Devel-
opment Bank provided a guarantee. In case the smallhold-
ers do not comply with the repayment of their credit in due
time, the company would be forced to use this money to
complete the loan on behalf of the farmers. This is a strong
incentive for the company to push each farmer to pay back
his loan.
Farmers involved in the scheme are quite optimistic about the
future: after the company will have completed the replanting
program in 2015, the oldest replanted palms will still yield dur-
ing 17 years before the end of their economic life. During this
period the yields will enable farmers to make enough profit.
At present, the average yield for the old palms stands at 6–
7 tons FFB/ha/year. Performance of newly replanted palms is
expected to reach 15 to 20 tons FFB/ha at their most productive
age (8 to 15 years) especially under good management prac-
tices. Farmers are still worried about theft of bunches from the
young producing palms.
3.6 Current measures adopted by agro-industries
to strengthen links with smallholders
Several agro-industries have tried to step up attractive
prices for a kilogram of FFB as a way of directing more small-
holders towards the company mill. As an example, CDC in-
creased the price for a kilogram of FFB from 45 to 50 FCFA
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Table 5. Cost of replanting per hectare in 2009.
Diﬀerent replanting operations Cost in FCFA (Euros)/ hectare
Felling of old palms 90 000 (137.2 e)
Trimming and windrowing of fronds 6500 (9.91 e)
Lining 4000 (6.1 e)
Cutting and transportation of pegs 2145 (3.27 e)
Holing 7150 (10.9 e)
Loading of plants 2860 (4.36 e)
Oﬀ-loading and transportation of plants close to the hole 3575 (5.45 e)
Planting and application of fertilizer 5720 (8.72 e)
Phosphate tricalcium 249 (0.38 e)
Fully grown oil palm seedlings × 143 224 169 (341.74 e)
Transportation cost 12 870 (19.62 e)
Total 359 238 (547.66 e)
Source: Field survey in SOCAPALM Eseka, 2013.
(0.07 to 0.08 e) in 2011, while Pamol did the same in 2012
from 42 to 46 FCFA (0.06 to 0.07 e) per kilogram FFB and
the immediate payment in cash of at least 50% for a minimum
quantity of FFB supplied to the company.
Currently Pamol buys a kilogram of FFB at 55 FCFA
(0.08 e) at mill gate and 51 FCFA (0.078 e) farm gate. The
price oﬀered by Socapalm stands at 48 FCFA (0.07e)/kg FFB.
The cost to transport one ton of FFB from the farm to the mill
is paid as follows: 4 FCFA (6.1×10−3 e) per kg FFB at Pamol;
2 to 3 FCFA (3.1 × 10−3 to 4.6 × 10−3 e) at CDC and 5 FCFA
(7.6 × 10−3 e) at Socapalm. Companies do not take into ac-
count the distance from the smallholder plantation to the com-
pany’s mill, meanwhile independent transporters would ask
smallholders to pay for transportation cost in accordance with
the weight and the distance from the smallholder plantation to
the industrial mill. Thus smallholders end up spending about
8000 to 12 000 FCFA (12.2 to 18.29 e) per ton FFB on trans-
portation cost. However, such incentive measures decided by
companies are not enough and their impact is hampered by
several structural factors which include:
– the emergence of artisanal mills which pay instant cash and
better prices to farmers (Nkongho et al., 2014);
– the poor status of road infrastructures/transportation lo-
gistics, which leads to high transportation cost for
smallholders;
– the recurrent breakdowns in industrial mills due to worn-
out equipment and poor investment and maintenance;
– a low purchase price for FFB and the absence of any
regulatory framework from the government that favors
partnership.
4 Discussion: The future of (partnerships in)
the oil palm industry in Cameroon
4.1 Increasing investments from local elites
Elites in Cameroon considered oil palm plantations not
only as a way of securing an additional profit apart from their
main source of income but also as a means of acquiring land
that could be transferred to their heirs. It is also a way to boost
their social status inside their community of origin (Levang
and Nkongho, 2012; Ndjogui and Levang, 2013). This in turn
helped in the stimulation of petty business in rural settings.
It would thus be unfair to reduce the involvement of elites to
land “grabbing". At a time when the State’s involvement in
the agricultural sector is almost insignificant, elites are virtu-
ally the only engine of agricultural development in Cameroon.
Following the recurrent failure of major projects for agricul-
tural development in the late 1980s, the implementation of
the Structural Adjustment Programme in 1989 resulted in the
withdrawal of the State from agricultural development and this
has led to the collapsing of the agropastoral infrastructure in
the country (Fonjong, 2004). This withdrawal was concomi-
tant with a fall in prices of major agricultural export and it
led to the virtual disappearance of sources of rural finance and
consequently the contraction of economic activity. Hopes in
the development of microfinance proved exaggerated, and tra-
ditional informal saving structures like the tontines remained
the only financial instrument available to rural households. Un-
fortunately, the amounts of money redistributed by tontines are
too small to support agricultural development projects and they
are usually restricted to the support of social and cultural ac-
tivities. As a result, the only eﬃcient financial support in rural
areas to date is provided by the elites. Of course this funding
is dedicated to activities initiated and controlled by the elites
themselves. But the supply of money for the purchase of land
is redistributed to landowners of the village and the establish-
ment of plantations generates significant employment oppor-
tunities for the poorest households. Unfortunately the money
raised by the sale of land is seldom used to support any pro-
ductive investment and employment opportunities are mainly
captured by migrants. Should we then prohibit or discourage
investment by elites? In this case, they are not responsible for
the misuse of money from the sale of land by the villagers.
Clearly, the problem that is facing the rural poor in Cameroon
comes less from the elites than from the absence of alternative
sources of funding for agricultural development. Elites merely
fill a vacuum and most probably the situation of the rural popu-
lation will be even more vulnerable without their investments.
The recent interest of large oil palm companies from
Southeast Asia to the Congo Basin and particularly to
Cameroon can be either a blessing or a curse for the non-
industrial plantation sector. If the Government allows such
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companies to settle under the agro-industrial classic model,
small farmers, villagers and elites will be quickly marginal-
ized because they will be unable to compete. On the contrary,
if the Government authorizes the granting of land to big com-
panies with the mandatory integration of a large number of
smallholders along the lines of NES schemes then it will build
on the potential of poverty reduction provided by the smart
cultivation of oil palm (Levang and Nkongho, 2012).
4.2 A revamped partnership between smallholders
and agro-industries
Previous studies showed that fair and balanced agreements
between agro-industries and smallholders can be of mutual
benefit when compared to the standard agro-industrial model.
Such agreements provide a means of cheap and eﬀective use
of local people as labor for agribusiness capitalist. In fact,
the village plantations are explicitly recognized as a way to
outsource production. According to Konings (1986) the CDC
village plantation is less eﬃcient because producers bare al-
most all the production costs as they get inputs and agricul-
tural services in the form of a loan that must be repaid with
interest after harvest; and more, agribusiness escapes loads
from a complete proletarianization (payment of family mem-
bers or casual laborers employed by the planter, social secu-
rity, housing, etc.). Smallholders schemes provide a less risky
production system for agro-industries because the fluctuation
of prices on the world market automatically aﬀects producers
who also bear the risk of crop failure.
According to Carrère (2010) and Nkongho et al. (2014),
the benefits deriving from village plantations are numerous.
Indeed they guarantee a stable income to planters, they pro-
mote security in land tenure and they enhance the monetiza-
tion of the rural settings thus generating development. It is
also argued that village plantations induce individualization
of land and contractual liabilities (debts) that destabilize tra-
ditional institutions. Smallholder schemes are also suspected
of further marginalizing the poorest social groups (youth and
women) and finally they can deepen inequalities as elites stand
out even more from the rest of the community (Carrère, 2010;
Gerber, 2008).
According to Rival and Levang (2013), the choice of the
model for oil palm development is not a technical one, but a
societal choice. Egbe (2004) also stresses the need for rural
women to be taken into consideration concerning funding op-
portunities for agricultural projects to alleviate poverty.
4.3 New foreign investors: Herakles Farms as the first
of a new kind of investors
Due to increasing global demand for palm oil and suit-
able conditions for oil palm development, Cameroon has wit-
nessed a sharp rise in investors’ enquiries seeking land to
plant oil palms since 2009. At least six companies are cur-
rently trying to secure over 1 million hectares of land for
the production of palm oil in the southern forest zone. These
companies include Sithe Global Sustainable Oils Cameroon
(SGSOC), Sime Darby, Biopalm, Goodhope, Palm Co and
Smart Holdings, etc.
Sithe Global Sustainable Oils Cameroon (SGSOC) is a lo-
cally registered company in Cameroon, owned by Herakles
Farms, (aﬃliate of Herakles Capital), based in New York USA.
Herakles Farms acquired 100 percent ownership of SG Sus-
tainable Oils from Sithe Global, an aﬃliate of the Blackstone
Group, in 2009 (Hoyle and Levang, 2012).
At first, the total concession requested from government
by SGSOC was 73 086 ha (30 600 ha in Ndian Division and
42 600 ha in Kupe-Muanenguba Division). The site of this
proposed plantation lies inside a globally recognized biodi-
versity hotspot between the protected areas of Korup National
Park, Rumpi Hills Forest Reserve, Bakossi National Park and
Banyang-Mbo Wildlife Sanctuary. These are all key habitats
for primates, elephants, buﬀaloes and a multitude of rare, en-
demic and IUCN red-listed species of animals and plants.
In September 2009, SGSOC signed an agreement with
the Government of Cameroon’s Ministry of Economy, Plan-
ning and Regional Development (MINEPAT). In 2010, SG-
SOC started the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
for the project. In September 2011, MINEP issued SGSOC an
Environmental Certificate. SGSOC and Herakles Farms were
members of RSPO, the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil
(Hoyle and Levang, 2012). SGSOC had to face stiﬀ resistance
from both the local population and local and international con-
servation NGOs. The local population complained that the
project did not suﬃciently address their needs and accused the
government/company of land expropriation, a situation which,
if not addressed carefully, can put the future generation into
jeopardy as very little land will be available for subsistence
farming and other developmental projects. The company was
also accused of lack of transparency in its dealings with some
key ministries in the government. Local and international con-
servation NGOs claimed that the company did not suﬃciently
address issues related to the conservation of fauna and flora as
its concession areas were surrounded by four protected areas
of high conservation value forest (HCVF). The priorities of the
company at first did not contain any will to develop the small-
holder oil palm sector in its area of establishment. The com-
pany was accusing the local population of being manipulated
by social and environmental NGOs for selfish motives, stress-
ing the fact that the proposed area will greatly benefit from
the much-awaited development needed by the local population
through employment opportunities and social/infrastructural
development.
After all the imbroglio between Herakles Farms, the
local population and social and environmental NGOs, the
Government of Cameroon finally decided by presidential de-
cree (2013/416 of 25 November 2013) to grant Herakles Farms
a provisional concession of 13 195 ha in Nguti subdivision
of Kupe Muanenguba Division. Decree No. 2013/418 of 25
November 2013 granted Herakles Farms another provisional
concession of 5 384 ha in Mundemba sub-division and decree
No. 2013/417 of November 2013 granted another provisional
concession of 1264 ha to Herakles Farms in Toko sub-
division, both in Ndian division. Thus a total concession area
of 19 843 ha (from its previous demand of 73 086 ha) was
granted to Herakles Farms from the National forest domain.
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This means that 27.2% of the total concession requested by
SGSOC was finally granted by the Government on a provi-
sional basis. Apart from the concession leased by the Govern-
ment to SGSOC to develop a nucleus estate, the company will
also have to develop 10 000 ha of land for farmers from the
surrounding villages, with customary claims to SGSOC con-
cession as a way to redress some of the socio-economic plights
of the local population.
4.4 Recommendations for oil palm development
in Cameroon
The development of the oil palm sector in Cameroon
should embrace a broad perspective considering social, en-
vironmental and economic realities. If planned carefully, the
development of oil palm can lead to strong economic devel-
opment of the region, as well as a reduction in rural poverty.
If not, the extension of palm oil plantations may result in the
loss of high conservation value areas and in negative impacts
on the livelihood of local communities and indigenous people
(Hoyle and Levang, 2012; Skurtis et al., 2010).
In order to amplify the positive eﬀects and reduce the neg-
ative impacts, there is a need for the government of Cameroon
and involved stakeholders to develop a national palm oil strat-
egy that can steer the rapid expansion of the sector and also en-
sure that expanded production does contribute to Cameroon’s
sustainable development goals. In order to achieve this goal,
it is pivotal that the government urgently engages all stake-
holders from the outset (including government departments,
companies, local communities, international and local NGOs).
The development of oil palm in Cameroon needs to ben-
efit from the experience of major producing countries by
implementing such expansion according to the highest in-
ternational standards (such as the ones established by IFC,
the International Finance Corporation from the World Bank
Group). A strategy for the smart development of the oil palm
sector should consider the following directions:
– Invest in productivity and yield increase in the existing oil
palm plantations using selected and certified planting ma-
terial and adopting best management practices.
– Ensure that all future palm oil expansion in Cameroon is
developed in a sustainable way with minimum impact on
carbon emission levels and biodiversity, by focusing first
on “degraded lands”.
– Avoid the overall reduction of the primary forests with an
emphasis on development of areas which are already de-
forested or cleared.
– All new oil palm development in Cameroon should
adopt and implement the principles and criteria of the
Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). The require-
ment to comply with the RSPO standards for palm oil pro-
duction in Cameroon should be part of national policy and
regulations.
– Make sure that smallholders benefit from the development
of agro-industrial complexes, either by establishing out-
growers contracts following the current model in Southeast
Asia (where a percentage of at least 30% of the total area
is reserved for smallholders) or by establishing measures
to support family farming (provision of selected seedlings,
inputs, technical support, training, etc.).
– The rights and roles of indigenous people and local com-
munities should be respected, notably the adoption of free,
prior and informed consent (FPIC) policies and the trans-
parent communication/publicity about any proposed plans
to develop new plantations.
– Special attention should be paid to the reviewing of regu-
lations related to land acquisitions in order to protect and
secure local land rights (Feintrenie, 2013; Feintrenie and
Raﬄegeau, 2012; Hoyle and Levang, 2012; Sayer et al.,
2013; Skurtis et al., 2010).
5 Conclusion
Before the independence and re-unification of the British
and French Cameroon in 1961, very little was done to build
partnership between agro-industries and oil palm smallhold-
ers. While agro-industries like Pamol and CDC benefitted from
the utilization of quality tenera hybrid seeds and better milling
eﬃciency, oil palm smallholders on the other hand harvested
the native dura variety either from wild oil palm groves or
planted in their farmland mostly in agroforestry based systems.
Smallholders also used artisanal traditional milling methods
with much lower extraction rates and unhygienic conditions to
produce red palm oil.
After independence and re-unification, as a means to boost
oil palm production and fight poverty, the Government of
Cameroon established SOCAPALM under a Nucleus Estate
Smallholder model and extended this model to CDC and
Pamol under the FONADER development scheme. Although
this project greatly improved livelihoods through the provision
of technical assistance, quality planting material and inputs
like fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides at subsidized rates,
the project lasted only for 12 years, from 1978 to 1990. The
project also recorded numerous pitfalls and FONADER un-
derwent bankruptcy.
Leaders used their positions in administration and man-
aged to divert benefits that were meant for the poor. More,
the project targeted only wealthy locals who owned land and
did not provide any opportunities for the marginalized class
like unemployed youths and women. Besides, contracts link-
ing smallholders and agro-industries were unilaterally negoti-
ated without the involvement of the local population.
The project also proved ineﬃcient in the area of moni-
toring and evaluation by independent bodies. There was no
strong incentive from companies to make sure that smallhold-
ers did repay their credit since the loan came from a com-
pletely diﬀerent institution. Smallholders complained about
the absence of transparency on the total amount to be reim-
bursed as well as on the modalities of reimbursement. After
the collapse of the FONADER scheme and the implementa-
tion of the structural adjustment program, the Government did
very little to develop the oil palm sector and to foster part-
nership between smallholders and agro-industries. The Projet
Villagisation sponsored by Afriland First Bank, a pilot project
of SOCAPALM Eseka with smallholders is not very diﬀerent
from the FONADER scheme, as it is marked with similar flares
and shortcomings.
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As opposed to other cash crops like cocoa, coﬀee, and rub-
ber that rely much on the international market, palm oil bene-
fits from an increasing domestic and sub-regional market. The
oil palm areas cultivated by agro-industries has remained rela-
tively stable over the years while areas exploited by smallhold-
ers have tremendously increased over a short period, although
recording very poor yields.
With the arrival of new oil palm plantation companies in
Cameroon and the interest shown by already established com-
panies to expand their cultivated areas, there will be significant
changes (either positive or negative) in the oil palm landscape
in the near future. The new companies – just like their older
counterparts – will be requesting new areas to develop/expand
their plantations. Public attention must be paid to the granting
of these areas in order to avoid any additional forest conver-
sion, habitat destruction for wild animals, social crises with in-
digenous and local populations and increased pollution to the
environment. Also the domestic and sub-regional market that
used to exist may drastically be saturated and as such there will
be need for new markets not only for agro-industries but also
for smallholders.
Our study proposes the development of a national strategy
document for the oil palm industry that will serve as a road
map for the new and old palm oil companies seeking for land
to develop oil palm. Such a consensus document should focus
on yield improvement, on the establishment of legal and in-
stitutional frameworks to acquire land from the Government,
the inclusion of a national interpretation of RSPO Principles
and Criteria to guarantee future markets and the securing of
appropriate funds.
Last but not least, there is a clear need for a political will
and the promotion of transparent and innovative measures by
government in order to strengthen partnership between agro-
industries and oil palm smallholders. The shortcomings of the
FONADER and Afriland First Bank sponsored schemes call
for future partnership schemes in the oil palm sector to be
mutually beneficial and sustainable. All these measures will
greatly help in avoiding the adverse eﬀects of oil palm devel-
opment and in meeting up with the poverty reduction strategy
put in place by the government of Cameroon.
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